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ACLU letter opposing FBI Carnivore surveillance system



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Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2000 16:36:02 -0400
To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
From: Barry Steinhardt <Barrys@aclu.org>
Subject: Carnivore Letter

Declan,

Below is the text of the letter that the ACLU sent today to the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution regarding the FBI's aptly named 
"CARNIVORE" system for intercepting email. This is the system that was the 
subject of this morning's story in the Wall Street Journal.


Barry Steinhardt



July 11, 2000

VIA FAX
Hon. Charles T. Canady, Chairman                Hon. Melvin L. Watt, 
Ranking Member
Constitution Subcommittee of the                Constitution Subcommittee 
of the
House Judiciary Committee                       House Judiciary Committee
362 Ford House Office Bldg.                     362 Ford House Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20515-6220             Washington, D.C. 
20515-6220

Dear Representatives Canady and Watt:

We are writing to you about the new FBI email surveillance system aptly 
named "Carnivore," which gives law enforcement extraordinary power to 
intercept and analyze huge volumes of email. The Carnivore system gives law 
enforcement email interception capabilities that were never contemplated 
when Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act  (ECPA), 
codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. 2510-22 and 18 USC 3121-27. 
Carnivore raises new legal issues that cry out for Congressional attention 
if we are to preserve Fourth Amendment rights in the digital age.

The existence of Carnivore first came to light in the April 6 testimony of 
Attorney Robert Corn-Revere to the Constitution Subcommittee. Its operation 
was further detailed in a report that appeared in today's Wall Street 
Journal (copy attached).  According to these reports, the Carnivore system 
-- essentially a computer running specialized software-- is attached 
directly to an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) network. Carnivore is 
attached either when law enforcement has a Title III order from a court 
permitting it to intercept in real time the contents of the electronic 
communications of a specific individual, or a trap and trace or pen 
register order allowing to it obtain the "numbers" related to 
communications from or to a specified target.

But unlike the operation of a traditional a pen register, trap and trace 
device, or wiretap of a conventional phone line, Carnivore gives the FBI 
access to all traffic over the ISP's network, not just the communications 
to or from a particular target. Carnivore, which is capable of analyzing 
millions of messages per second, purportedly retains only the messages of 
the specified target, although this process takes place without scrutiny of 
either the ISP or a court.

Carnivore permits access to the email of every customer of an ISP and the 
email of every person who communicates with them. Carnivore is roughly 
equivalent to a wiretap capable of accessing the contents of the 
conversations of all of the phone company's customers, with the "assurance" 
that the FBI will record only conversations of the specified target.  This 
"trust us, we are the Government" approach is the antithesis of the 
procedures required under our the wiretapping laws. They authorize limited 
electronic surveillance of the communications of specified persons, usually 
conducted by means of specified communications devices.  They place on the 
provider of the communications medium the responsibility to separate the 
communications of persons authorized to be intercepted from other 
communications.

Currently, law enforcement is required to "minimize" its interception of 
non-incriminating communications of a target of a wiretap order.  Carnivore 
is not a minimization tool. Instead, Carnivore maximizes law enforcement 
access to the communications of non-targets.

In his testimony to your subcommittee Mr. Corn-Revere described the 
experience of his client, an ISP that was required to install Carnivore 
when presented with a trap and trace order. He detailed his client's 
concerns that a trap and trace order in the context of the Internet 
revealed information that Congress did not contemplate when it authorized 
their limited use. In the traditional telephone context, those orders 
reveal nothing more than the numbers dialed to or from a single telephone 
line. In the Internet context, these orders and certainly Carnivore, likely 
involve ascertaining the suspect's e-mail address, as well as header 
information that may provide information regarding the content of the 
communication.

As we have stated previously, the ACLU does not believe that it is clear 
that the Government can serve an order on an Internet service provider and 
obtain the e-mail addresses of incoming and outgoing messages for a 
particular subscriber.  Further, it is not clear whether law enforcement 
agents use or should use authority under the pen register statute to access 
a variety of data, including Internet Protocol addresses, dialup numbers 
and e-mail logs.  We certainly do not believe that it is clear that law 
enforcement can install a super trap and trace device that access to such 
information for all of an ISP's subscribers.

In light of the new revelations about Carnivore, the ACLU urges the 
Subcommittee to accelerate its consideration of the application of the 4th 
Amendment in the digital age.  Legislation should make it clear that law 
enforcement agents may not use devices that allow access to electronic 
communications involving only persons other than a specified target for 
which it has a proper order. Such legislation should make clear that a trap 
and trace order served on an ISP does not authorize access to the contents 
of any communication  including the subject line of a communication -- and 
that the ISP bears the burden of protecting the privacy of communications 
to which FBI access has not been granted.

We would be happy to work with the Subcommittee on drafting legislation 
that protects the privacy rights of Americans.

Sincerely,



Laura W. Murphy
Director, ACLU Washington National Office



Barry Steinhardt
Associate Director, ACLU



Gregory T.  Nojeim
Legislative Counsel, ACLU Washington National Office

cc:  Members of the Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee













Barry Steinhardt
Barrys@aclu.org
Associate Director
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Broad St. New York, NY 10004
212 549 2508 (v) 212 549 2656 (f)


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